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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE 1977 PROCEDURAL AMENDMENTS TO THE
CLEAN AIR ACT-HAVE THEY MADE A DIFFERENCE?
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, CLEAN AIR ACT-The 1977 Procedural Amendments to the Clean Air Act have not caused the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals to give more deference to decisions by the
Environmental Protection Agency. If anything the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals is taking a harder look than ever at decisions of the EPA.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)' originally enacted in 19462
required only three things of a federal agency wishing to promulgate a
rule: (1) the federal agency must give notice in the Federal Register of
the proposed rule;3 (2) the agency must give the public an opportunity
to participate through written or oral comments; 4 and (3) the agency must
publish a final rule incorporating a concise general statement of the agency's basis and purpose for the rule.' Transcripts and exhibits of material
received at non-mandatory public hearings along with all papers and
requests filed in the proceedings constituted the exclusive record for
decisions by the agency and for judicial review of that decision.' The
rule could be overturned when judicially reviewed only if it was found
to be "arbitrary and capricious."' Different courts have defined "arbitrary
and capricious" in different ways, but for purposes of this comment
Black's Law Dictionary definition is sufficient and precise. It defines
"arbitrary and capricious" as "willful and unreasonable" action by an
administrative agency.
The APA applied to rulemaking by the EPA until 1977 when Congress
amended the Clean Air Act. The amendments included a new rulemaking
procedure for the EPA to use in promulgating regulations for industry.
The House of Representatives thought these new procedures were necessary "to assure consistency in policy and legal interpretations" between
different regional offices of the EPA. 8
1. 5 U.S.C. §553 (1982).
2. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 238 (1946).
3. 5 U.S.C. §533(b) (1982).

4.Id.§ 553(c).
5. Id.
6. Id.§ 556(e).
7. Id.§706(a)(2).
8. H.R. REP. NO. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1105 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. NO. 294].
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The amended procedure supplants the APA procedure for EPA rule
promulgation under the Clean Air Act.9 The Administrator must still begin
with a proposed rule published in the Federal Register. However, the
proposed rule must now be accompanied by a statement of its basis and
purpose.1" The statement must include a summary of the factual data,"
the methodology used in obtaining and analyzing data, 12 and the major
legal interpretations and policy considerations underlying the proposed
rule. 13 The statement must also refer to pertinent data taken from the
Scientific Review Committee 14 and the National Academy of Sciences. 15
It also must explain any excluded data from these sources.
Under the new procedural requirements the Administrator must establish a "rulemaking docket"' 6 which shall be kept open for public inspection.' 7 The statement of the basis and purpose and all data it relies
on must be placed in the docket.' 8 All written comments and transcripts
of mandatory public hearings must also be put in the docket. ' Any
relevant documents received after the comment period must be placed in
the docket, 20 as well as all drafts for interagency review and all documents
and comments received on these drafts. 2'
The new procedural requirements force the Administrator to accept
comments, just as the APA would, but in addition, the Administrator
must respond to each significant comment, criticism, or new data which
comes to light during the comment period.2 2 Both written and oral comments must be accepted and the docket must be kept open for thirty days
after completion of the mandatory proceedings to allow for submission
of rebuttal and supplementary information.23
The final rule must still be accompanied by a statement of the basis
and purpose. However, it must also include an explanation of the reasons
for any major changes from the proposed rule.24 The promulgated rule
must be based on information found in the docket.'
9. 42 U.S.C. §7607(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
10. Id. §7606(d)(3).

11. Id. §7607(d)(3)(A).
12. Id. § 7607(d)(3)(B).

13. Id. § 7607(d)(3)(C).
14.
15.
16.
17.

This Committee was newly established by the amendments.
42 U.S.C. §7607(d)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
Id. §7607(d)(2).
Id. §7607(d)(4)(A).

18. Id. §7607(d)(3).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. §7607(d)(4)(B)(i).
Id.
Id. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii).
Id. § 7607(d)(6)(B).
Id. § 7607(d)(5)(iv).
Id. § 7607(d)(6)(A).
Id. § 7607(d)(6)(C).
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The docket constitutes the exclusive record for judicial review.2 6 The
standard for review is still "arbitrary and capricious" ' 27 on all substantive
issues. For procedural errors, the court may invalidate the rule "only
if the errors were so serious and related to matters of such central relevance
to the rule that there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would have
been significantly changed if such errors had not been made." 29
NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS BACKGROUND
The overall scheme of the Clean AirAct requires the EPA to set National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and the states to set emission
limitations on stationary sources. 3" For "new sources" the EPA, not the
states, must set the emission limitations. 3' "New sources" are stationary
sources "the construction or modification of which is commenced after
the publication of regulations... "32 The Administrator shall ". . . publish a list of categories of stationary sources" which in the Administrator's
judgment "cause or contribute significantly to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare." 33 Following the listing of a category the Administrator must set New Source
Performance Standards (NSPS). These standards "shall reflect the degree
of emission limitation and the percentage reduction achievable through
the application of the best technological system of continuous emission
reduction which (taking into consideration the cost of achieving such
emission reduction, any non-air quality health and environmental impact
and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated."'
Since the promulgation of these NSPS affects all plants in a particular
category, they will have a nationwide effect. That means that persons
wishing to challenge their promulgation must appeal to the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.35 It is these challenges that this
comment will analyze to determine whether the new procedural require26. Id. § 7607(d)(7)(A).
27. Id. § 7607(d)(9)(A). The House version of the amendments would have changed the standard
to "supported by substantial evidence" but the Senate would not go along with the change. H.
CONF. REP. NO. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1558.
28. Substantive review covers review of the standards set by the EPA while procedural review
covers alleged failures by the EPA to use the procedures mandated by Congress.
29. 42 U.S.C. §7607(d)(8) (Supp. V 1981).
30. Id. § 7410. The EPA sets the overall goals while the states figure out how to limit pollution
at the source so as to meet the air quality goals.
31. Id. §7411.
32. Id. §7411(a)(2).
33. Id. §7411(f).
34. Id. § 1857(c)-(6)(a)(I).
35. Id. §7607(b)(1).
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ments of the Clean Air Act have resulted in additional deference to the
EPA by the court. This comment will analyze three pre-amendment cases
and two post-amendment cases which are representative of the court's
approach to NSPS challenges. Non-procedural issues raised in each case
will not be analyzed in this comment.
PRE-AMENDMENT CASES
Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus36
In 1971 the EPA published the first list of "categories of stationary air
pollution sources which significantly contribute to the endangerment of
public health and welfare. ,3 7 Included on that list were steam generators,
incinerators, sulfuric acid plants, nitric acid plants, and portland cement
plants. 8 Approximately five months after publishing 39the list the EPA
published standards of performance for each category.
The Portland Cement Association challenged the standards promulgated
by the EPA for emissions of particulates by portland cement plants. The
emission limitation for portland cement plants was set at .30 lbs of particulate emission per ton of feed to the kiln for all new plants.40 The
Portland Cement challenge had three basic arguments: (1) there was no
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepared by the EPA, (2) EPA
had not adequately considered the economic cost of the standards, and
(3) the standard was not achievable.
The court found that the section of the Clean Air Act which required
the EPA to set NSPS was the functional equivalent of an EIS4 and the
court would not require more from the EPA. On the economic challenge
by the Association the court, per Judge Leventhal, looked to the record
and found that the Administrator had considered economic studies and
had found that the cost of installing anti-pollution equipment to meet the
standard would be approximately 12% of the plant's investment budget
and operating the new equipment would cost approximately 7% of the
operating cost of the plant.4' The Administrator did not consider that
excessive. The court seems to apply a strict "arbitrary and capricious"
standard here and does not look at the reasonableness of the cost figures
of the EPA. Since the EPA did consider costs, the court will not overturn
the EPA.
36. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), after remand, 513 F.2d
506 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 1092 (1975).
37. 36 Fed. Reg. 5,931 (1971).
38. Id.
39. 36 Fed. Reg. 15,704 (1971).
40. 486 F.2d at 378.
41. Id. at 386.
42. Id. at 387.
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The petitioners argued that the EPA should have done an actual cost!
benefit analysis. The court said that a cost/benefit analysis by the Agency
was not necessary, but that if the Association wanted a cost/benefit analysis
considered by the Agency the association could present such an analysis
to the EPA for consideration.43 In addition, the court found that the Agency
had done some cost/benefit analysis when it considered the elasticity of
demand. The Agency had found that if the plants passed on the costs of
the installation and operation of the anti-pollution equipment to their
customers, demand for their product would not significantly drop. 44 Again
the court was applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Since the
EPA looked at economic factors the court would require no more. Here
the court is putting the burden on the challenger to show that a cost/
benefit analysis would show that a different standard should have been
set. Congress specifically requires the EPA to consider the cost of achieving emission reduction, 45 but does not require the EPA to do cost/benefit
analysis.
The challengers further argued that the economic cost to them was
higher than the cost to other listed categories, specifically incinerators,
because incinerators were allowed to emit more particulate emissions than
portland cement plants. The court found support in the record for a
different standard for portland cement plants than for incinerators even
though the court thought the Agency need not support different standards. 46 Different standards were probably envisioned by Congress when
it required the Agency to set standards for each category rather than for
all categories. 47 In this case the Administrator had found that the technology was available to achieve the lower standard for cement plants,
but was not yet available for incinerators.4 8 The court accepted the Administrator's findings in this regard partly because the Association did
not challenge the availability criteria and partly because it found the
distinction did not need support. When considering the due process issue
on remand 49 the court stated, "No doubt the Administrator will be influenced by accumulated experience should it give rise to reasons for modification of the range now existing between the prescribed standards.""0
Perhaps the court wanted to leave open the possibility of a due process
challenge for reargument later, but in this case the differences were not
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 388.
42 U.S.C. §7411(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
486 F.2d at 389.
42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. V 1981).
486 F.2d at 389.
513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Id. at 508.
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found to be "arbitrary and capricious" because the EPA did have a basis
for their distinction.
Even though the court accepted the economic analysis of the Agency,
the court did not accept the Agency's analysis of the achievability of the
standard. The court rejected the Agency's analysis because its analysis
was supported with test data accumulated after the standard was set. Since
that is effectively no support at all, it was found to be "arbitrary and
capricious." The Agency had not made its test data and methodology
available to the industry in time for them to challenge it. The court
specifically required the EPA to consider the contentions of the Association. 5' While this remand appears to be very pro challenger, the court
went further and stated that the Agency could have supported its analysis
by extrapolation of data accumulated before the standard was set if the
Agency had been responsive to comments and testimony of experts. 2
The court is giving specific guidance to the EPA, but not to the challengers ."
It appears that the court was forcing the Agency to use a procedureresponse to comments-which Congress had not yet mandated. The court
the Agency to make its test data and methodology available
also required
54
to industry.
Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus55
At the same time that Portland Cement was challenging NSPS for
portland cement plants, Essex Chemical Corporation brought a challenge
for sulfuric acid plants and Appalachian Power Company brought a challenge for steam generating facilities. The court chose to address the Essex
Chemical and Appalachian Power challenges in one decision. The NSPS
for sulfuric acid plants was set at 4 lbs of S02 emission per ton of sulfuric
acid produced and the NSPS for coal-fired steam generators was set at
1.2 lbs of SO 2 emission per million Btu of electricity produced. 6
The court, per Judge Tamm, defined its own standard of review before
it addressed the specific challenge that the standards were not achievable.
51. 486 F.2d at 394.
52. Id. at 402.
53. After remand the court, per curiam, affirmed the NSPS for Portland Cement plants because
the additional tests did support the standard-no longer "arbitrary and capricious." Apparently the
EPA satisfied the court even though it could not satisfy the challengers without a court battle.
54. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on this case, but later in Vermont Yankee NuclearPower
Corporationv. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Supreme Court told the District of Columbia Circuit
Court that they could not dictate procedure to the EPA. Perhaps Vermont Yankee should be limited
to NEPA challenges. Maybe Congress needs the input from the court to make changes in the law.
55. 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
56. 36 Fed. Reg. 24,876 (1971). The court did not readdress the challenges to the lack of an
EIS and the lack of cost/benefit analysis, but instead referred the reader to the PortlandCement
analysis.
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The court stated that it would look for reasonableness in the standards. 5 7
The court would consider whether the Administrator had based his decision on relevant factors and would look at the record to see if the
decision made was the result of "reasoned decision making." 5 8 The court
would remand to the Agency only if it found a "clear error of Judgment." 5 9
This seems to be a different standard than "arbitrary and capricious,"
but may really only be a new definition of the same standard. Perhaps
combining a step forward with "reasonable" and a step backward with
"clear error of judgment" leaves the review at "arbitrary and capricious. "
The Essex Chemical Corporation challenged the 4.0 lbs/mBtu standard
as too low because 6.5 had been the level suggested during comment.
The court found that the 4.0 standard was based on information derived
from inspections, consultations, and literature.' The court found that the
EPA had used test data from plants operating at 52% capacity but had
also based its standard on results of European plants found in the literature
and on industry supervised tests. 6' The court concluded that the 4.0 limit
was low, but based on "reasoned decision making." 62 If the plant which
could achieve the standard was only operating at 52% capacity there
seems to be a serious question of representativeness. However, the court
downplayed the representativeness question, perhaps because of the support found in the industry supported tests and the literature. With any
support at all the court would not find the standard "arbitrary and capricious" or "clearly erroneous."
The court found that the coal-fired steam generator standard of 1.21
lbs/mBtu, challenged by Appalachian Power, was based on tests of a
prototype, tests of full-scale control systems, literature sources, available
fuel supplies, and documentation of manufacturer's expectations. 3 Since
the standard was well supported in the record the court could find no
"clear error of judgment." However, the court did remand because the
EPA had failed to fully consider the adverse environmental effects of
using the best technology available-a lime slurry scrubbing system.'
Such consideration was required by the Clean Air Act and lack of consideration is "clearly erroneous" or "arbitrary and capricious."
The Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari, and this case did not
reappear in the Court of Appeals, so it is probably fair to say that the
EPA was learning from its mistakes. The Agency was apparently able to
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

486 F.2d at 417, 434.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 435.
Id.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 441.
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satisfy both industry and the environmentalists that the standard was
correct even when it did fully consider the adverse effects of the best
technologically feasible system.
NationalAsphalt Pavement Association v. Train65
In 1973 the EPA added asphalt concrete plants to its list of "categories
of stationary air pollution sources which significantly contribute to the
endangerment of the public health and welfare." 6 6 At the same time the
Agency proposed standards for the industry.67 The Asphalt Pavement
Association challenged the EPA's right to propose standards for the asphalt
industry without giving the industry an opportunity to comment on the
designation of "significant contributor" prior to the proposed standards.
The Association also challenged the standards themselves.
The court, per Judge McGowan, found no error by the EPA because
the Agency did allow the industry to comment on the designation during
the comment period and at hearings on the standards.68 Thus, the Agency
did not act "arbitrarily and capriciously." There appear to be two reasons
why the court did not go into depth on this issue.
First, the court seems to consider that Congress had set a time limitation
on the EPA. If the agency took time to allow comment on the designation
prior to proposing standards the potential for delay would increase. Second, the court stated that it was willing to give more deference to the
EPA when it was making legislative policy choices such as deciding whom
to control.69 Without saying so; the court implied that it was willing to
give less deference when the EPA was actually administering the congressional mandate by promulgating standards.
Besides these two policy reasons for giving the EPA more leeway in
chosing whom to regulate, the court found that the petitioners had failed
to point out anything in the record to indicate that the EPA had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding to list asphalt concrete plants as
an industry subject to NSPS regulations.7" The court failed to address the
distinct possibility that if the Agency did act "arbitrarily and capriciously," there would be nothing "in the record" to support that claim.
On the issue of the standards themselves 7 the court upheld the EPA
even though the standards were based on limited testing. Even limited
testing is not "arbitrary and capricious." The court found that the standard
65. 539 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
66. 38 Fed. Reg. 15,380 (1973).
67. Id. at 15,406.
68. 539 F.2d at 781.
69. Id. at 783.
70. Id.
71. 40 C.F.R. §§60.2-.8, 60.12, 60.90-.93, 60.100-.106, 60.110-.113, 60.120-.123, 60.130133, 60.140-.144, 60.150-.154 (1974).
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of review is appropriately deferential since technology is not the court's
expertise but the Agency's.72 The court does not explain how this is less
deferential than the deference given when the EPA designated the industry
as a "significant contributor" to air pollution even though it claimed to
be less deferential on issues of standards than on issues of designation.
Except for this decision, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals seems to be making it the business of the court to become an
expert in technology and thus able to look closely at EPA standards to
determine if they are "arbitrary and capricious" or based on "reasoned
decision making" or at least not "clearly erroneous." Without making
an effort to become experts the court cannot really judge the sufficiency
of the record and would always remain highly deferential. Fortunately
for the challengers the court has become the expert and will look closely
to find if there has been error.
POST-AMENDMENT CASES
National Lime Association v. EPA73
On May 3, 1977, the EPA added lime manufacturers to its "list '74 and
proposed standards for the industry.75 The final standard for particulate
emissions by a lime manufacturer using a rotary kiln was set at .15
kilograms of particulate emission per megagram of limestone feed. 76 The
Lime Association challenged the standard as not achievable. The Association claimed that the EPA test data was not representative of the industry.
The court, per Judge Wald, found that the EPA had supported its
standard with test data from sites which could achieve the standard, but
that the Agency had failed to explain fully its choice of sites for testing
in the record. 77 Requiring the Agency to "explain fully" its choice is
requiring more than just a lack of arbitrariness. It seems that if the court
were sticking to its "arbitrary and capricious" standard it should find that
any support is enough. The court also found that the Agency had failed
to support its decision to discard data from sites which failed to achieve
the standard. 7' Failure to support fits more closely to the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review.
The court found that it was required to give a "hard look" at the
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

539 F.2d at 786.
627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
42 Fed. Reg. 22,510 (1977).
Id. at 22,506.
40 C.F.R. §§ 60.340-.344 (1978).
627 F.2d at 443.
Id.
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Agency's decision79 and when the court did take a "hard look" it found
gaps in the Agency's rationale. The court mentions that this "hard look"
approach was retained in the 1977 amendments. In fact it was actually
"arbitrary and capricious" which was retained in the 1977 amendments.
From this case it appears that the "hard look" is getting harder all the
time as the court becomes more expert in the field of environmental law.
The court was troubled by the industry's failure to supply its data on
unachievability, but found that the EPA must affirmatively show that its
standards reflect consideration of all variables.80 This approach seems to
be in direct contradiction to the approach in PortlandCement, where the
court found that if the industry wanted cost/benefit analysis considered
by the Agency, industry must supply the analysis. To be consistent, if
industry wants variable data considered, they should present it to the
Agency.
The court found that the EPA had set out such variables as gas velocity
and operating levels, but had failed to explain how those variables were
taken into account when the Agency set the standard at. 15 kg/mg. 8' The
court also found that the EPA had failed to closely examine the effect
this standard would have on coal use.82 Requiring close examination
appears to be requiring more than a lack of arbitrariness. The EPA had
also failed to consider the impact of particle size variation on the effectiveness of different pollution systems.83 Taken together, all these failures
by the EPA led the court to conclude that the EPA had not supported its
promulgated standard as achievable. The court was unwilling to say that
any one of these factors alone would be enough to find error, but taken
together there was error. The court did not say that taken together it was
clear that the Agency had acted "arbitrarily and capriciously." Rather,
the court said that its "hard look" showed error. It appears that the court
is shifting from looking for lack of arbitrariness to looking for error in
spite of Congress' retention of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.
Thus the court remanded this case to the Agency for reconsideration,
but sent along some guidelines to assist the Agency in the future. The
court stated that the EPA was only required to provide sufficient data to
demonstrate that the Agency had taken a systematic approach to problems. 84 The court stated that it would find that the Agency had taken a
systematic approach and used "reasoned decision making" if it: (1) accounted for variables, (2) supported the representativeness of its test sites,
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 451.
Id. at 437.
Id.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 454.
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(3) assured the court of the validity of its testing methods, and (4) showed
85
the court that its test methods were determined statistically significant.
In addition, the court would require the Agency: (1) to state its assumptions, (2) reveal its processes, (3) explain its rejections, and (4) set forth
its rationale. 6 The court would prefer that the Agency support its rationale
in its initial support statements. However, it would not require support
in the initial support statements. Even though the court presented its
"requirements" as "guidelines," the EPA is expected to accept the court's
guidance in such matters.
While the court is careful not to force additional procedures on the
Agency, the court does seem to be telling the Agency how to make a
record for judicial review. The "guidelines" seem to come from the
procedural requirements of both PortlandCement and the new procedural
requirements of the 1977 amendments. The court, however, claims they
come from PortlandCement, without mentioning the amendments.87 This
decision was not appealed to the Supreme Court. Perhaps with judicial
"guidelines" plus statutory procedures the court has found a way to
demand more than a lack of arbitrariness from the Agency without crossing the Supreme Court.
Sierra Club v. Costle 8
In 1976 the Sierra Club and others petitioned the EPA to revise its
standards for SO 2 emission for coal-fired steam generating plants. The
environmentalists claimed that changes in technology made 90% reduction feasible and they wanted the EPA to require such reduction. 9 The
EPA investigated and proposed an 85% reduction standard. 9° However,
the final standard provided for a variable reduction. 9' The new standard
left the 1.2 lbs of SO 2 emission per Btu of electricity produced as the
maximum pollution allowable (as approved in Essex Chemical), but required 90% reduction for plants using high sulfur fuel and 70% reduction
for plants using low sulfur fuel.92
The Sierra Club and the California Air Resources Board challenged
the variable standard, the modeling technique used by the EPA, and the
70% lower reduction requirement. Utility companies challenged the 90%
higher reduction requirement and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
challenged the 1.2 ceiling on procedural grounds. The court, per Judge
85. Id. at 452-53.

86. Id. at 453.
87. Id.

88. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
89. Id. at 315.
90. 43 Fed. Reg. 42,154 (1978).
91. 40 C.F.R. §§60.8, 60.40, 60.40a-.49a (1981).

92. Id.
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Wald, chose to combine all these challenges into one case, but for the
sake of clarity, this comment will analyze each challenge separately.
The Sierra Club Challenge
On the challenge to the variable standard the court found that the Clean
Air Act specifically allowed for variations if the EPA supported the variations in the record.93 The court seems to imply that there is some specific
statutory requirement for support of variable standards. However, there
is no such requirement set out in the statute separate from the general
requirement that all decisions by the EPA be supported by the record.94
The court also found support for variations in the legislative history.
The court found that the Agency must consider all of the relevant factors
and must demonstrate a reasonable connection between the facts in the
record and the resulting policy choice." The only function of the court,
according to Judge Wald, is to insure that "the Agency, given an essentially legislative task to perform, has carried it out in a manner calculated
to negate the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality in the formulation
of rules . . . for the future." 96 In this case the EPA set variable standards
because it found, through modeling, that variable standards could achieve
the same results as one standard but would be more cost-wise. The court
seems to say that the EPA thus did some cost/benefit analysis which is
not required. In fact the EPA was responding to political reality. If, in
order to do that, they must do some cost/benefit analysis the EPA will
do the analysis.
Sierra Club challenged the use of modeling, but the court upheld the
EPA's use of modeling because the Agency could demonstrate a rational
connection between the factual input, the modeling assumptions, and the
results and conclusions of the Agency.97 In addition, the court found that
the EPA had discussed modeling and its assumptions in its proposed rule
and had accommodated the Sierra Club's objections voiced during the
comment period. 98 The court found that modeling was allowable because
public disclosure of the assumptions on which the model was based was
a sufficient safeguard to prevent abuse. 9 This field of modeling is another
field in which the court feels it is not an expert. Perhaps over time, as
more challenges are made, the court will become more of an expert in
modeling, as it has in environmental law in general.
3. 657 F.2d at 319.
94. Id. at 322.
95. Id. at 323.
96. Id. at 322-23.
97. Id. at 338.
98. Id. at 335.
99. ld. at 334.
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The Sierra Club also challenged the 70% low reduction requirement
because it was based on the use of a dry scrubbing technique which had
not been considered in the proposed standard. The court found that the
EPA did not use the dry scrubbing technique as the sole basis for its lower
standard.'"' The court found the EPA was justified in encouraging the use
of the dry scrubbing technology, even though the support for such encouragement was "less than overwhelming."'.' The court found that even
though 70% was not specifically discussed during public comment, it
was a continuation of the sliding scale analysis which was open to public
comment.0 2 Even though the court found "limited substantiation" 0 3 for
the determination that 70% was the best percentage achievable while still
promoting a new technology, the court declined to remand. The court
would have preferred that the Agency had reopened comment once the
new technology was seriously considered because the court felt that to
do so would have been the wise strategy,"' 4 but the court would not require
the EPA to always use the wise strategy. The court seems to be falling
back from its "hard look" to allow for technology-forcing innovations.
It is unclear why they will accept technology-forcing in this area, but in
others will require the EPA to prove "representative" testing.
The Utility Company Challenges
The utility companies challenged the 90% reduction requirement as
unachievable. The companies claimed that the proposed standard of 85%
was based on the use of flue gas desulfurization (FGD) alone, while the
final 90% reduction requirement was based on a technology which combined FGD and pre-washing. They claimed that changing from one technology to another was a major change for which the EPA must reopen
comment.
The court found that the industry was not entitled to a new comment
period because the record indicated that a combination technology had
in fact been discussed in the first comment period. Therefore, the public
had actual notice and adequate explanation of the proposal to use a
combination technology.0 5 In addition, the court found that industry had
been using washed coal for some time. They should have plenty of data
on how it works with and without FGD. If industry had problems with
the combined technology they should have presented their documented
evidence to the EPA. They did not do so; therefore, they are precluded
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 345.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 360.
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from now raising a potential problem. This appears to be a flashback to
the Portland Cement decision, which required the industry, rather than
the EPA, to do cost/benefit analysis. This is in contradiction to the court's
statement in National Lime Association that the EPA is required to affirmatively support its decisions."
The industry tried to challenge the representativeness of the data used
by the EPA in setting the 90% reduction standard. The court quickly
disposed of that argument by finding that it was correct for the EPA to
use projected rather than actual achievability criteria. 1 7 The court accepted the EPA statement that the standard is designed for new plants,
not existing ones. The court also found evidence in the record that improvements in any actually used system are feasible.'0 8
In issuing new regulations the EPA also changed the particulate emission standard reducing the allowable particulate emissions from .10 lbs/
mBtu to .03 lbs/mBtu. The industry challenged this reduction as well,
claiming it was not achievable. The court found that the EPA had demonstrated that the standard was achievable using baghouse technology'0 9
even though the EPA had failed to substantiate that the standard was also
achievable through the use of electrostatic precipitators (ESP). 0 It appears that any method used to prove achievability is enough-another
flashback to "arbitrary and capricious" review. The court did not address
the problem of the differences in cost between baghouses and ESP even
though baghouses are newer and presumably more expensive than ESP.
The EDF Challenges
The EDF challenged the fact that the EPA did not reduce the 1.2 lbs
of SO 2 emission per mBtu of electricity produced standard. This group
claimed that the EPA had succumbed to political pressure not to promulgate stricter controls. To support this allegation the EDF proved that
the EPA had continued to have ex parte communications with the White
House and with several senators after the close of the comment period.
Some of these communications were explained in the dockets while some
were not. Some of these communications were not included in the docket."'
The EPA acknowledged that stricter controls were technologically feasible, but found that stricter controls would be excessively burdensome
on producers and users of high sulfur coal. Apparently this potential
106. 627 F.2d at 444.
107. 657 F.2d at 364.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 384.
110. Id. at 380.
111. The EDF found out about the unexplained meetings through the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA).
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burden was the focus of the ex parte communications. The court was
concerned about meetings not documented in the record," 2 but the court
also found that the EPA is given discretion to determine which documents
(and oral communications) need to be placed in the docket."' The court
recognized that the EPA promulgation of NSPS is informal rulemaking
and not adjudication. Even though the court felt a particular bias against
ex parte communications because of their judicial outlook the court accepted the EPA position that the statute does not forbid exparte meetings.
Also the EPA is an executive agency and must consider political pressures,
especially if they come from the White House. As long as the EPA bases
its decisions on the record the court will not overturn these decisions. In
this case not changing the standard was apparently based on the record
even though the court did not address this specifically.
It appears that the court would have preferred that the Agency reopen
comment after the ex parte communications, but would not consider the
EPA's decision not to reopen comment error. If the Agency had reopened
comment the industry and the environmentalists would have had an opportunity to counter the political pressure with some of their own. Perhaps
the Agency did not want to be faced with other political pressure. As the
court said, "Finality, after all, has a place in administrative rulemaking,
just as it does in judicial decision making."" 4
CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit Court has not given more deference to the EPA since
the 1977 procedural amendments. If anything the court is harder than
ever on the Agency. It doesn't appear that the harder look is based on
any procedural requirements imposed by Congress but, rather, the harder
look is based on the court's growing expertise in the field of environmental
law.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court doesn't seem to think that the
procedural amendments have changed anything between the EPA and the
challengers, be they environmentalists or industry. Perhaps the court
agrees with the House of Representatives, which said that the procedural
amendments were directed at insuring consistency between EPA district
offices rather than at insuring a better relationship between the EPA and
its challengers. " '
It appears from this analysis that while the D.C. Circuit Court is
becoming more expert in environmental law with each case it decides,
112. 657 F.2d at 400.

113. Id. at 403.
114. 657 F.2d at 400.
115. H.R. REP. NO. 294, supra note 8.
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the court is not ready to take a firm stand on what its review standard
should be. In PortlandCement the court is clearly using the strict "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Then in Essex Chemical the court sets
up a "reasonableness" coupled with a "clear error of judgment" standard.
Both these cases were decided in the same year, yet the standard is slightly
different. In NationalAsphaltthe court falls back to excessive deference.
Even the same judge does not appear to use the same standard consistently. In National Lime Judge Wald is very hard on the Agency and
is using a "hard look" standard. Then in Sierra Club, she is much more
deferential to the Agency using some standard incorporating "feasible"
and lack of arbitrariness.
Until the D.C. Circuit Court decides for itself what the standard of
review should be, it will be most difficult for both the EPA and the
challengers to prepare a case for trial or know when to settle their differences without the assistance of the court.
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